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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Stop and Frisk-Reasonableness
Under the Fourth Amendment
Terry was convicted by a state court of carrying a concealed
weapon on evidence obtained by the arresting officer who had
observed Terry and two other men engaged in unusual conduct.
The unusual conduct of the men had lead the arresting officer to
believe the men were contemplating a daylight robbery. Acting on
this belief, the officer stopped and frisked the men, discovering a gun
in Terry's pocket. Terry was convicted in the state court of carrying
a concealed weapon. Held, affirnied. Under certain suspicious
circumstances a police officer is justified in making a limited search
for weapons even though there is no probable cause for arrest.
Terry v. Ohio, of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
The Terry case represents the first time the Supreme Court has
squarely faced the question of whether a police officer may con-
stitutionally stop and frisk' a suspect without his consent, in the
absence of adequate grounds for an arrest.2 Traditionally the
Supreme Court has held that governmental intrusion upon one's
personal security, as guaranteed by the fourth amendment,' is
legitimate only when there exists probable cause for an arrest.4
Actually what the fourth amendment guarantees is not protection
against all searches and seizures, but only those that are unrea-
sonable.5
The test of reasonableness has traditionally been probable cause.6
The novelty of the Terry case lies in the fact that probable cause
1 For purposes of this article, these terms are used only to denote certain
police activities and their use is not an attempt to aid in the resolution of
the difficult constitutional questions concerning these practices. The Court
emphatically rejects the notion that these terms, stop and frisk, can be
used to manipulate the requirements of the fourth amendment. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 122, 214 N.E.2d. 114 (1966).
3 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
4 Bringar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
5 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).6The Supreme Court has said probable cause for a search and seizure
exists where the facts and circumstances, within the arresting officer's
knowledge, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The substance of all definitions (of
probable cause) is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. Id.
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for an arrest did not exist.' The Court, in Terry, raises the question
whether it is always unreasonable for a police officer to stop and
frisk a suspect when probable cause for an arrest does not exist.'
In approaching the difficult question of the constitutional propriety
of a stop and frisk, it is first necessary to separate the stop from
the frisk. This can best be accomplished by a discussion of what
the majority opinion in Terry did or did not say concerning each
issue. Though the majority stated that the crux of the case was
the propriety of the frisk,9 it is the opinion of some that substantial
comments was made on the propriety of the initial stop."0 Justice
Harlan in a concurring opinion stated that the majority implicitly
said that a protective search may always be made when the stopping
is justified." Thus, for Justice Harlan, the stop was the important
issue, because once "such a stop is reasonable . . . the right to
frisk must be immediate . . . if the reason for the stop exists." 2
The majority in Terry indicated that there are two types of stops;
one is an investigative stop and the other a forcible stop. 3 The
former may be more appropriately termed an approach and ques-
tion, 4 while the latter a seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.
The majority reasoned that there is a legitimate governmental
interest in crime prevention and detention and, in the appropriate
circumstances and manner, a police officer may approach an
individual in order to investigate possible criminal behavior.'"
However, given these generalities, the Court did not go into parti-
culars to establish guidelines governing what will constitute ap-
propriate circumstances in order to justify the approach and question.
Moreover, the Court in Terry decided nothing concerning the
constitutional propriety of the investigative stop.'6  Since street
7 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
1id. at 15.
9 1d. at 23.
1o E.g., LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron,
Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 39 (1968).
"1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968).
12 Id.
,3 Id. at 15.
,4 The reason for the use of this term is the fact that the Court in Terry
recognized that police officers have a legitimate investigative function for the
prevention and detention of crime and the usual means to accomplish this is
by approaching an individual and asking questions.
IfTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). The usual means for carrying
out this function is by questioning a suspect. Inquiry is recognized as a utilitar-
ian step in the criminal process. 1965 U. ILL. L. REv. 119, 123.
16 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
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encounters are "incredibly rich in diversity,"" the Court stated that
investigation or approach and question is permissible under the
right circumstances"8 without specifying what activities would con-
stitute these circumstances.
Possibly of somewhat more significance was the Court's deter-
mination of when a seizure, or forcible stop, is effectuated. The
Court held that this forcible stop occurs when a police officer "by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen."' 9  However, the Court said
that it could not decide from the facts in Terry whether such a
forcible stop occurred prior to the officer making physical contact
with Terry. 0 Thus, it seems a seizure, which is governed by the
fourth amendment, occurs at that point in the encounter when a
citizen may not disregard questions posed to him and freely walk
away.
2
'
It is perhaps unfortunate that the majority avoided the question
of the limitations upon the investigative stop. By so doing, the
Court detoured the more difficult problems of the stop and frisk
altercation."2 However, the intentional ambiguity on this issue will
make it quite simple for the Court to give the Terry ruling a very
narrow interpretation, should subsequent police activity warrant
such a course.2
The Court has declared that it is "not unmindful" of the needs
of society for efficient law enforcement.2 In the wake of present
day civil disorders and the rising amount of injuries and deaths
17 Id. at 13.
'8 Id. at 22.
'
9
Id. at 19.
20 Id.
21 Here again the Court established a generalized standard without giving
particular guidelines as to what action will or will not constitute restraint
or show of authority. The situation is hardly conceivable where an officer
would approach an individual to investigate his suspicious behavior and then
allow that suspect to disregard questions and freely walk away, without
first insisting upon a satisfactory explanation of his behavior. In many
instances failure to answer a few questions may make an already suspicious
police officer more suspicious. Thus, by so insisting upon answers the officer
may either use physical force or show of authority thereby constituting a
seizure by the Court's definition.
22 La Fave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 Mici. L. REv. 39, 63 (1968).2 3 Id. at 125.24 EIkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Stern, Stop and Frisk:
An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CriM. L.C. & P.S. 532,
536 (1967).
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to police officers 5 there is apparent the need to protect police from
being subjected to assaults while in the course of their investigative
function. Moreover, the police have an affirmative duty to protect
lives and property and there exists a bona fide public interest in
police investigative practices. As the Court stated, "[I]t would have
been poor police work indeed for an officer of thirty years experi-
ence" not to have investigated Terry's behavior. 6
The Terry case is not a retreat from a prior holding that whenever
practical a police officer must obtain prior judicial approval, i.e.
a search warrant,2 7 to conduct a search.28 The Court only sanctioned
those certain circumstances where there is a need for swift action
based upon on-the-spot observations by the officers.29 Each case
must be decided on its own merits and the limitations the fourth
amendment places upon protective frisks must be developed in
concrete factual circumstances.
30
The particular circumstances necessary to make a frisk con-
stitutionally reasonable in the absence of probable cause for an
arrest may be indicated by observing the facts in the Terry case."
Though the particular acts of the men may have appeared innocent
in themselves, when viewed as a whole it was not unreasonable to
assume the men were contemplating a robbery, calling for further
investigation. Since robberies generally involve the use of weapons,
the Court held under these circumstances the frisk was reasonable.
To clarify what circumstances will justify a frisk in the absence of
probable cause, the Court decided Sibron v. New York, 2 as a com-
panion case. In Sibron there was also a conviction resulting from
evidence obtained by a frisk. However, there the court held that the
25 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
2 6 Id. at 23.2 7 1d. at 20.
'
8 Implicitly the Court is saying that because of the police officer's legiti-
mate function there have to be some sanctions available to the officer to
protect himself. And that these sanctions should be available even though
the existing facts are insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest.29 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
30 1d. at 29.
31 The facts showed that the officer, with 39 years police experience,
observed Terry and two others engaged in unusual conduct. Routinely one
of the men would walk down the street, look into a particular store window,
walk on, turn around, look again in the same store window, and then return
to the other men. This would immediately be followed by a conversation
between the men. The same procedure went on approximately twelve times.
The officer testified that he suspected the men of "casing a job, a stick-up"
and feared "they have a gun." Id. at 6.
.2 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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officer's actions were not reasonable in conducting the risk.33 From
the facts34 it was apparent that at no time did the officer have any
reasonable apprehension that Sibron was armed and presently
dangerous. There may have been some justification for believing
that criminal activity was afoot. However, the activity was not of
such nature that would have led a reasonably prudent police officer
to believe it involved the use of weapons.
Thus it is the apparent rule from the Terry and Sibron decisions
that a police officer is only acting reasonably, i.e. within the fourth
amendment, in frisking a suspicious person when there exists a
reasonable apprehension of danger to the officer or those in the im-
mediate vicinity. 5 This rule is qualified by the fact that the officer
must be acting as a reasonably prudent man. Further, under the
particular circumstances the suspected crime must be of such a
nature that it would involve the use of weapons.36
The officer must be able to point to specific and articulate activi-
ties3" of a suspect to determine if the acts reasonably suggest a
crime, and the crime is one which is characterized by violence
and the use of weapons. A hunch of good faith on the officer's part
is not sufficient.3" If the crime is not one so characterized the officer
is not justified in his frisk without a search warrant; consequently,
any action on his part without such a warrant will be unreasonable.
Such suspected crimes as robbery, assault, murder, forcible rape,
331d.34 Sibron was convicted of unlawful possession of heroin. The facts
showed that while the officer was patrolling his beat, he observed Sibron
continually for eight hours. That during this time the officer saw Sibron in
conversation with six or eight narcotic addicts. Officer testified that nothing
was overheard and nothing was seen to pass between any of these men.
Sibron went into a restaurant and spoke to three more addicts. While eating,
the officer approached Sibron and asked him to come outside. Once outside,
the officer said, "You know what I am after", whereupon he thrust his hand
into Sibron's pocket, discovering heroin. The court held the search could not
be justified as a self-protective search for weapons. Id.
35 ['Ihis type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly
drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the
protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).3 6
1d.3 7 1d. at 21.
38 Ct. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).39 Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detention and Frisk, 3
CRiM. L. BULL. 597 (1967).
40 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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abduction, and burglary are surely examples of crimes which would
warrant a frisk under the principles established by the Court.
Some factors a police officer may find helpful to use as guidelines
in observing a suspect include: the suspect is demeanor, his manner-
isms, whether or not the officer has knowledge of his background,
any information received from a third person, what, if anything, the
suspect is carrying, any strange bulges in suspect's clothing, whether
there has been recent criminal activity in the vicinity,39 the officer's
experience,"' the geographic area,4' and if there is an immediate
danger to life or property.42
Though circumstances exist sufficient to justify the frisk, the Court
further requires that the officer identify himself and then make
reasonable inquiry as to the nature of the individual's behavior.43
If the responses are insufficient to dispel the officer's reasonable
apprehension, the officer may then conduct a limited frisk. The
scope of the frisk itself also has strict limitations. Since the justifica-
tion for the frisk is the protection of the officer, its scope must be
limited to those outer areas of the clothing which can be used to
conceal weapons.44 Once these various procedures are followed "any
weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the
person from whom they were taken".4"
Some recent Supreme Court decisions have been criticized 6 for
their apparent tendency to weigh the balance between effective law
enforcement and individual personal security too much in favor
of the latter. The Terry decision may represent a departure in the
thinking of the Court which would have the effect of weighting the
balance somewhat more in favor of law enforcement, at least in the
area of crimes of violence.
John Michael Anderson
42 41 So. CAL. L. REv. 161 (1967).
43 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968).4 4
1d.
45 Id.4 6 Eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The suspect must be
warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes
may be used against him, and that he has the right to counsel whether or
not he can afford. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The accused
has the right to counsel and the refusal to honor his request constitutes a
denial of this right as guaranteed by the sixth amendment; and any state-
ment made under these conditions cannot be used against him. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The fourth amendment was applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.
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